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An Introduction to the Critique of Kulturkampf 
Denise Ferreira da Silva∗ 
Let’s go ahead, set up our dichotomies and choose our colors.  
Now read the text: what matters is what the options already prescribe, 
the meaning of being before or after the “/,” the possible and 
potential “truths” a particular position enables and/or precludes?  
Explicitly or implicitly, the authors in this cluster address this 
question when each shows how the recent articulation of the term 
Kulturkampf rehearses the pair public/private, the founding liberal 
distinction.  When doing so, they delimit the challenge facing 
progressive legal scholarship in a global (juridical, economic, and 
ethical) configuration ruled by the conservative versions of the liberal 
principles of diversity and multiculturalism.  After each account of 
neoconservative reactions to the social (racial, gendered/sexual, 
economic) subaltern’s demands for (juridical and political) 
representation, as I hope the reader will notice, it becomes evident 
that any progressive rebuttal of the tale of “cultural wars” should 
begin with the acknowledgement that the prevailing formulation of 
the domain of the private deploys racial and cultural difference as 
markers of those who fail to embrace the principle of universality.  
When doing so they ask the reader to be aware of easy dichotomies 
that recall the liberal ontology in which the principle of universality 
and its signifiers produce the political scene as an abstract, 
transcendent, configuration in which (racial, gender/sexual and 
cultural) difference enters as a troubling rather than a constitutive 
aspect of social life. 
Through three moves these papers indicate the need for a 
(re)formulation of the social which would not be immediately 
resolved in the neoliberal-neoconservative reframing of the 
 
∗  University of California, San Diego. 
  
1282 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1281 
public/private dichotomy. First, to advance a conception of justice 
(social justice), which seemingly contradicts law’s universality 
principle, each addresses a signifier—race, religion, gender, and 
sexuality—that refers to what I will call later the Global Matrix.  By 
doing so, they indicate how the writers of the tale “cultural wars” 
deploy the principle of universality in an ethico-political battleground 
in which these categories emerge as moral signifiers.  Second, they 
refuse neoconservative reconfigurations of cultural (identity) politics 
that rewrite universality in a transparent domain of the public and 
projects/demands for social justice onto a blurred domain of the 
private.  Third, none err by taking sides.  Each cautions us that the 
sides only come into being together—that the neoconservative 
version of cultural difference already assumes that juridical 
universality organizes the public domain.  Put differently, when read 
as a unit, these papers show that a viable critique of the tale of the 
“cultural wars” should include the recognition that the terms—the 
positions the hegemonic principles of diversity and multiculturalism 
write—demarcate a political stance which ignores that the global now 
constitutes the site of a productive struggle and a scene of ethical 
embattlement created by the neoconservative reading of the 
postmodern landscape.  Not surprisingly, each author makes these 
moves separately.  After all they engage a tradition—liberal 
thought—which like all traditions never ceases to re-invent itself. 
While naming this tradition will not resolve the predicament it 
poses at the core of any critical legal project—but more particularity 
to Critical Race Theory (CRT)—it does help us to understand why 
progressive legal scholarship should engage neoconservative 
articulations of the private in defenses of juridical universality.  
Undoubtedly, the critical position these papers delineate, the one to 
which LatCrit has been consistently moving towards, emerges in a 
terrain which has been mapped by articulations of the principle of 
universality, the one which distinguishes liberal (onto-
epistemological) accounts.  This terrain has been demarcated by a 
notion of juridical universality—the founding thread that goes back 
to Locke’s formulation of the idea of the rule of law itself.  Through 
the distinction between public and private, this troubling, yet 
productive inheritance has manufactured the social subject 
presupposed in what Michel Foucault terms the juridico-political 
conception of power.1  While immersed in ordered actual 
relationships of exchange, as Peter Fitzpatrick reminds us, this social 
(legal and political) subject has been always a global figure.  For the 
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“individual,” the “self-regulated subjectivity,” the autonomous figure 
classic liberal theorizing describes emerging in Europe, “is a 
condition for the existence of modern, liberal legality”, who shares in 
law’s unique nature which is that it “is no longer tied to any 
extraneous order, now deriving its force and origin purely from its 
intrinsic being.”2 
For this reason, when interrupting the public/private dichotomy 
with the question of the law’s (in)ability to ensure social justice, the 
papers in this cluster necessarily displace juridical universality—that 
of the law and of the social subject it institutes—when they recall the 
limits of the social ontology that renders the possibility of collective 
existence contingent upon the conception of the law as an 
autonomous, exterior, controlling, force. 
Nevertheless, the conception of (social) justice critical legal 
theorizing (and other postmodern projects) advocates relies upon 
the rendering of the principle of universality that produced the 
subaltern subjects against which neoconservatives now unleash their 
“moral wars,” the one which  renders it possible to address the limits 
of juridical universality.  Here, I refer to the post-Enlightenment 
projects of knowledge of society—anthropology, sociology, 
psychoanalysis, etc.—which attempt to reconcile the abstract essence 
which is actualized in the market, the state and legal apparatus, and 
the actual differences that characterize modern collective existence, 
ones which produce the modern (social) subject as a 
spatial/temporal, a global-historical thing.  That is, each shows how 
in the tale of the “cultural wars,” the place of the proper social (legal 
and moral) subject only encompasses a particular kind of human 
beings, but ones whose (cultural) particularity only makes sense when 
contrasted with other past and contemporary modes of being 
human.3 
Because I cannot discuss the details of this second articulation of 
universality, namely scientific universality, in the limited space of this 
introduction, I move to show how, when exploring how a given social 
scientific signifier—race, class, culture, gender/sexuality—is 
reformulated in the neoliberal/neoconservative tale of “cultural 
wars,” this cluster invites us to consider these categories as signifier of 
the Global Matrix.  In this invitation, I find the suggestion that we 
have reached the limits of the 1980s politics of difference (or identity 
politics or cultural politics), and that it has been absorbed into the 
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‘original’ social model, which critical legal theorizing rejects, and 
which is now re-articulated in the tale of “cultural wars.”  Consistently, 
this social ontology does not immediately allow for a mapping of the 
Global Matrix—the ethical-juridical configuration which 
encompasses the kind of human differentiation upon which critical 
legal theorizing grounds its challenges to legal formalism and upon 
which the writers of the tale of “cultural wars” rest their return to 
their claim that the “individual,” or the “original” social 
(legal/moral) thing is the sole subject of the private entitled to claim 
juridical universality.  Rejecting the privileged position, the public 
domain which remains a monopoly of the “original” liberal subject—
European, while, male, property owner—each paper invites us to 
revisit the axioms of liberalism informing the neoconservative 
rendering of the Global Matrix. 
What this cluster suggests is the need for another model, a 
global-historical model, which assumes that the kind of difference 
communicated by the categories of race, class, culture (religion, 
language, etc.), and gender/sexuality, is not an individual (or 
collective) substantive attribute.  Instead, it indicates that these 
consist in productive political strategies and are effects of social 
scientific representations, which now govern the global (juridico, 
economic, ethical) configuration.  My point is that, when arguing for 
the need to reconcile juridical universality and the recognition of 
social differentiation, in a formulation of justice which addresses the 
effects of juridical domination and economic exploitation, these 
papers indicate that demands for social justice cannot presume (as in 
the case of the Civil Rights movement) the nation-state as the sole 
ethico-political paradigm.  On the one hand, they indicate that to 
undermine the productive effects of the signifiers of the Global 
Matrix, and to redress the subjections they entail and justify, we need 
an ethical principle which privileges representation both (a) in the 
recognition that existing legal structures re-present a particular set of 
principles of the “original” (autonomous) legal subject, (b) in the 
production of a critical scholarship that re-presents, re-tells and re-
signifies the global-historical trajectory of subaltern social subjects, 
and (c) that in order to understand this trajectory as an effect of the 
social scientific signifiers which now organize our ‘postmodern’ social 
(juridical, economic, and moral) configurations. 
Each paper articulates a critique of the tale of Kulturkampf to 
address (at least) one crucial question that should be raised by any 
critical reading of, and political response to, the tale of the “cultural 
wars.”  (1) How do we reframe the subaltern legal perspective in such 
a way to preempt the most destructive strategies deployed in the 
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scene of theoretical embattlement?  (2) How do we retain social 
difference as the basis for demands for justice (juridical and political 
representation) without re-producing subaltern subjects as 
homogeneous and fixed cultural entities, i.e. as they have been 
constructed in social scientific scholarship?  (3) How do we reconcile 
the various social scientific signifiers—class, gender/sexuality, race, 
culture—in a critical project which does not repeat the pitfalls of 
universality, i.e. the move that erases how western (colonial and 
global) juridical, economic, and symbolic apparatuses produce 
subaltern subjects in the various global regions?  Finally, (4) how do 
we engage in the struggle for subaltern representation while aware 
that it will reinforce neoconservative agendas which recognize 
difference but only to write a moral tale which renders its demands 
for justice un-reconcilable with juridical universality?  From a position 
in between Derrick Bell’s racial realism and Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
strategic liberalism,4 they suggest that progressive legal theorizing 
needs to map the Global Matrix—to identify its constitutive pairs and 
to excavate and dissipate the “truth” they produce.  As they trace the 
effects of neoconservative appropriations of politics of 
representation, each paper describes the obstacles and suggests 
strategies for overcoming the founding public/private dichotomy 
which informing legal scholarship and in the global ethico-political 
grammar. 
I. THE RACE CRITIQUE: ITS OFFSPRING AND DISCONTENTS 
 In “Kulturkampf or ‘fits of spite’?: Taking the Academic Cultural 
Wars Seriously,” Sylvia Lazos-Vargas addresses the question of what 
should be the normative basis of the now fractured legal scholarship.  
Instead of calling for an armistice, she welcomes the battle.  She 
reminds us that the contention is productive only if a common 
ground for disagreement is identified, if destructive strategies are 
avoided.  That is, for Lazos-Vargas the academic “cultural wars” are 
both necessary and productive in the present situation of American 
legal scholarship. The problem, however, is that each of the 
contending parts she names—neo-traditionalists, radicals, 
assimilationists and latcriters—inhabits a moral position which, in its 
turn, defines what is to be valued and that which is to be obliterated.  
For this reason, instead of engaging each perspective as a position in 
the larger moral field which could be called legal scholarship, the 
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contenders choose to attack individuals and not their perspective—a 
consistent liberal war tactic, to be sure. 
 When describing how this particular deployment of morality, 
which addresses individuals and not their ideas, enters the academic 
arena, she shows how the founding division public/private division 
plays out in two fronts.  In the neo-traditionalists- Critical Race 
Theory (CRT) front, it tellingly actualizes the fundamental division – 
rational/irrational – communicated by the signifier race, which here 
takes the form of a distinction between objective/subjective, 
change/permanence, or truth/prejudice, etc.  On the one hand, 
neo-traditionalists’ statements redeploy the rational/irrational pair 
when accusing race crits of lack of intellectual rigor and 
emotionalism to delineate the proper (moral) boundaries where 
proper legal scholarship is produced.  That is, she shows how here 
the race signifier is not immediately, explicitly articulated but that it 
organizes a distinction between “the professional” and its “others” 
when neo-traditionalists accuse race crits of being badly trained legal 
scholars.  On the other hand, forced to play according to the rules 
the “professional/non-professional” (rational/irrational) pair 
institute, race crits cannot but charge that their foes deploy racial 
stereotypes, that their reading of critical race scholarship lacks 
“objectivity,” that it is resistant to change, based upon prejudice, etc.  
In this scene of embattlement, both sides deploy race as a moral 
signifier, which delimits the position that remains faithful to the 
signifiers of (academic) universality—namely, objectivity, change, 
truth, etc. 
 When contention takes place among racial subaltern legal 
scholars, the battle becomes overly personalized while at the same 
time the ethico-political stakes become more explicit.  At stake here, 
Lazos-Vargas argues, is a “minority perspective” as a point of 
departure for theoretical critique.  Among scholars of color, 
arguments regarding the appropriateness of a “minority” theoretical-
methodological perspective indicate a divide in terms of whether the 
assimilationist (civil rights perspective), a radical, or a more complex 
(LatCrit) critical position should prevail.  While the line separating 
the assimilationists from the others is easy to spot, the one separating 
the radical and the complex one is not.  According to Lazos-Vargas, 
the divide here has to do with the reliance upon historical-
materialism and its promises of a critical corner outside hegemonic 
liberalism.  If one recalls that historical materialism’s greatest 
promise was nothing but the realization (by universalizing it) of 
liberalism’s premise and promise that everyone is born and exists free 
and equal, then the predicament which, according to radical “old-
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timers,” haunt lat-criters is nothing more than the promise of 
liberation we all share.  When Lazos-Vargas advocates a “healthy 
dialogue,” however, she suggests that this embattlement can be 
productive.  Though she does not offer a path, her account of 
“academic Kulturkampf” suggests at least a guiding question: Either 
progressive legal (radicals and complex) scholars engage in a battle 
of ideas which will indicate an alternative to the premises and 
promises of liberalism or they will remain prisoners of the 
constitutive liberal dichotomy the rational/irrational—the one 
deployed in the neoconservative tales of Kulturkampf—which 
distinguishes between an intrinsically violent “state of nature” and an 
abstract composite, the body politic. 
II. POST-MOMS 
Why and how the neo-conservative rewriting of the 
public/private dichotomy has been so successful is a question at the 
core of Martha T. McCluskey’s “The Politics of Class in the ‘Nanny Wars’: 
Where is Neoliberalism in the Kulturkampf?”  In this piece, Professor 
McCluskey shows how it results from an artful deployment of 
public/private dichotomy in an ethico-political account which 
reconfigures another dear liberal pair, namely culture/economics, in 
which liberalism’s highest value, freedom, is constructed as a 
monopoly of the (righteous) individual.  Anyone familiar with the 
trajectory of modern philosophy would not cringe at this unexpected 
marriage of economy and morality in which the family becomes the 
site of a moral battle where the contending parts are differentiated 
according to how they view and behave towards marriage and 
childbearing/rearing.  For one thing, Locke’s proper political 
subjects—individuals able to conceive and ‘sign-on’ to the social 
contract—are European (white) males, property-owners, and heads 
of households.  The liberal social (juridico/economic) subject has 
always sided with the family—if for anything because the family was 
also his property, though he was not willing to trade it in the market. 
 What Professor McCluskey’s piece highlights however is not 
this recent re-enactment of the liberal play.  She is concerned with 
the fact that progressive intellectuals enter the moral battle from a 
defensive position.  Instead of challenging this founding 
public/private dichotomy, they choose the public, namely the 
economic, and accept the neoliberals and neoconservatives’ 
resolution of the signifiers of the Global Matrix—race, gender, class, 
sexuality, and religion.  That is, against progressive agendas that 
dismiss this separation by establishing that private has always been 
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public—the victory of 1960s Civil Rights, nationalist, feminist, and 
youth movements—neo-conservatives embrace their claim but rewrite 
it within the liberal logic which conceives of the private as individual, 
as a matter of (subjective) values and preferences.  When doing so, 
they turn the 1980s (cultural, identity) politics of representation on 
its head by advancing a politics of individual self-representation.  
With this, neo-conservatives reinstitute the classical social 
(legal/political) subject in a moral tale that rewrites the Global 
Matrix when they attribute a ‘failure’ to actualize proper moral 
(family) values to (racial, gendered-sexual) subalterns’ cultural 
difference.  For this reason, her analysis of Flanagan’s piece 
published in The Atlantic Monthly provides not so much an indictment 
of the feminist project itself, which has consistently (at least the 
second wave) focused upon patriarchy, but a version which seeks to 
keep the feminist (economic) bathwater and the baby too!  The 
inability to recognize the political/economic determinants of their 
“freedom” results not from the fact that feminism does not 
acknowledge class and race as producers/signifiers of female social 
(juridico and economic) trajectories.  As we well know, there have 
been many versions of the feminist project—in the U.S. women of 
color and third world feminists did not take long to call the attention 
to their middle-class, white, feminist comrades of their own 
universalizing tendencies.  What Professor McCluskey notes is how 
the neoconservative rewriting of the “original” liberal figure, the 
individual, finds its way into feminist discourse.  That is, she indicates 
how feminist discourse resurrects the social subject postmodern 
critical (feminist, racial, queer, etc.) interventions proclaimed no 
longer existent when it privileges the Global Matrix as grounds for 
ethico-epistemological-political engagement.  Whether the nanny is 
an undocumented immigrant from Venezuela, a refugee from 
Guatemala, or Puerto Rican, in the Global Matrix she belongs in a 
slot that always precludes her from occupying the position of the 
“individual.”  Hence, no matter how conscious the females she 
liberates become of the political/economic inequities neo-liberalism 
re-produces, as long as her employers do so from their position as 
U.S. white (or otherwise), middle-class females always already 
individuals, she will always inhabit the mark assigned to social (racial, 
gendered/sexual, economic) subalterns.  The nagging question, of 
course, is whether and how progressive legal scholarship can advance 
a mapping of the public sphere which comprehends the global 
(racial/cultural) subalterns, the ones whose subjection has for the 
last hundred years or so delimited the position of the proper social 
subject, the one the notion of juridical universality both presupposes 
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and institutes.  When asking this question I am not intimating that 
progressive legal scholarship is doomed because it shares in the 
predicament haunting any ethico-political project circumscribed 
(enabled/precluded) by the liberal social ontology.  As the Brazilian 
saying goes, the hole is farther down. 
Following the path already determined by the context they 
choose to intervene, each engage the dichotomy itself as the matter 
at stake, and all hold on to the “/” for without it critique itself would 
have no sense.  For moving towards (re)formulations of the above 
questions, the papers in this cluster choose to inhabit the “/.”  As 
each displaces this dichotomy, they respond to the challenges the 
cultural presents to the legal, which is represented as the latest 
rehearsal as a public versus private war.  The public before the 
private?  What is the crit legal scholar to do before this choice?  What 
are the options?  Both?  And?  Either/Or?  As each displaces the term 
Kulturkampf to uncover at the core of the liberal project productive 
fissures that, instead of rendering it irrelevant, make the critic’s task 
all the more crucial when the hegemonic ethico-political grammar 
discourse seeks to erase the dichotomy, not by collapsing the terms or 
by eliminating difference as the assimilationist strategy predicated, 
but by highlighting difference and describing the positions each 
social scientific signifier institutes.  Such strategy, as the rhetoric and 
practices the “faithful freedom-lovers” now deploy against the rest of 
the planet indicate, renders quite easy the (moral) justification of 
projects which seek not only to (legally/politically) exclude but to 
incarcerate or eliminate those global subalterns, the cultural warriors, 
the neoconservative tale places on the non-valued side of the “/.” 
 
